Abstract: This article examines the relationship between the Communist Party of Great Britain and Irish communists in both Ireland and Britain in the post-war era. It argues that the British party's strategic interest in Ireland gradually waned as it became apparent that Irish communism would remain divided by the border. The article also argues how, in Britain, competition between the nationalist Anti-Partition League and the communist dominated Connolly Association led the latter to abandon Cold War sectarianism and to adopt a 'broad strategy' championing civil rights in Northern Ireland. The article draws out the key role played by Charles Desmond Greaves in this process, whilst noting the importance of factionalism and external factors, notably the Irish Republican Army's Border Campaign.
Introduction
Prior to 1945, the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) had an important influence over the direction of communist organisation and policy in Ireland. In line with Comintern directives, British communists played a key role in the 'Bolshevisation' of the Communist Party of Ireland (CPI) during the 1920s, and the subsequent dissolution of the party in southern Ireland in 1941, despite local communist opposition (Milotte, 1984, p. 191 Northern Ireland's participation in the war, no similar northern dissolution took place. Rather, the relative popularity of the CPGB in wartime Britain was one factor in the rapid growth of communism in Belfast, and until the end of 1946, CPGB leaders regularly spoke on public platforms to assist in building up support for the local Communist Party (CP). 1 In southern Ireland, the post-war consolidation of communism did not lead to the re-establishment of the CPI; rather the unwillingness of cadres to identify as communist, mainly because of fears of clerical attack and government censure, meant a new party emerged in the guise of the Irish Workers' League (IWL) (Smylie, 2010, pp. 71-73) . This meant the CPGB had to re-configure how it would conduct relations with two partitioned Irish communist parties. This was further complicated by the existence, in Britain, of the Connolly Association (CA), an organisation of Irish emigrants dominated by communists.
The Irish communist 'movement', therefore, was characterised by the overlapping and occasionally fractious relationships between nominally autonomous groupings: the CPGB, the Irish communist parties, and the CA. Scholars of the CPGB have noted the long-term involvement of Irish people in British communism and how the 'freedom of movement between the countries remained a possible factor in the making of Irish communists' (Morgan, Cohen & Flinn, 2007, p. 199) . Nevertheless, there is no dedicated study of the relations between British and Irish parties in the post-war period. The most relevant historiography has indicated how this network influenced the development of the Northern Ireland civil rights movement in the 1960s, but it underestimates the complex dynamic of the process, and instead largely focuses on one individual, C.D. Greaves, the CPGB's 'Irish expert' and the leading figure in the CA. One authority also notes that opposition to Greaves existed in British and Irish communist circles, but this is discussed in passing and Greaves' own assessment of its cause, effect and resolution is uncritically accepted (Prince, 2007) .
This article firstly examines the characteristics of the relationship between the CPGB and Irish communists from the war's end to 1956, arguing that frustration with perceived Irish obfuscation lessened the CPGB leadership's direct involvement in Irish affairs. The next section examines the dynamic of Irish emigrant politics during the same period, arguing that competition between the CA and the Anti-Partition League led to a realignment in the Association's strategy which, guided by the CPGB, increasingly entailed adopting a broader populist platform, emphasising nationalism over socialism. The article then examines how Greaves came to dominate the direction of the Connolly Association against the backdrop of the IRA's 'border campaign' in the late fifties and early sixties. Finally, it considers how, having finally defeated opposition from within the 'movement', the Connolly Association's emerging prominence led to a concentrated focus on Northern Ireland, and the genesis of a civil rights strategy.
Fraternal and frustrated: the CPGB and Irish Communism, 1945-56
What were the main characteristics of the relationship between the Irish parties and the CPGB?
Firstly, the massive disparity in terms of membership and resources left it an unequal one from the outset. In Irish affairs, the CPGB provided political, organisational and ideological support, expertise and encouragement, occasionally to the point of dictating a line. Industrial affairs represented a shared sphere of activity, due to the presence of British trade unions in Ireland.
Indeed, CPGB figures briefed their Irish counterparts on the British trade union movement, while Irish communists reciprocated on Irish affairs. 2 Information concerning industrial matters, and much else, of interest to rank and file members was facilitated by the availability of the CPGB press in Ireland. Moreover, when Irish printers refused to work on the IWL's paper due to clerical pressure, the CPGB found a printer for the Irish Worker's Voice in England. 3 The Irish parties certainly took inspiration from CPGB activity, for instance, when following the British lead, the CP took up a campaign on behalf of squatters immediately following the war. The British Party also acted as a theoretical resource for Irish Communists.
Irish cadres often used CPGB literature for educational classes, while the Young Communist League in Belfast based its constitution on the CPGB's youth organisation. 4 The sharing of expertise extended on one occasion to Irish communist leaders attending the congress of the CPGB's Scottish division to learn about 'organisation'. 5 Above all, visits to Ireland by leading CPGB figures represented the most visible and significant aspect of the post-war relationship.
In August 1952, for example, Sam Aaronovitch, the CPGB's 'Cultural Commissar', visited Dublin for five days to oversee an IWL 'Educational School', which subsequently influenced IWL propaganda on the cultural Cold War. 6 In fact, Irish Communists generally held the CPGB in high regard, welcoming British 'advisers' and displaying little of the typical nationalist antipathy towards British interference or high-handedness. During the war the CP's propaganda occasionally referred to its General Secretary, William McCullough, as the 'Pollitt of the North'. In essence, the CPGB constituted the main link between Irish communism and the international movement, while the CPGB typically viewed itself as the guarantor of correct thinking and activity in Ireland, a view that Irish comrades apparently endorsed. However, during the 1950s the CPGB's relationship with the Irish parties would suffer from factionalism, perceived failures in relation to the international line, and the generally unfavourable conditions for communist advance in Ireland.
A report on the proceedings of a CP congress, in July 1950, written by the leading British communist Phil Piratin, demonstrates the nature of the relationship and highlights British priorities. Before leaving Britain to attend the Congress, Piratin met with fellow CPGB stalwarts Bob Stewart, and Peter Kerrigan. They agreed:
that we do not of our own accord intervene in the organisation or political approach; that we try by suggestion to get them to change the character of the discussion from that anticipated from the long and detailed Congress Discussion Statement; that instead, the discussion be restricted to the main problems, i.e. Peace, the Economic Position, and the Unity of Ireland. 7 Dissatisfied with apparent prevarication and failure to concentrate on specific objectives, the CPGB dispatched Piratin to focus Irish minds. In reality, an outbreak of internal CP factionalism and Piratin's dissatisfaction that 'nothing had been done' in relation to 'Peace' meant that the congress did not even discuss the 'Unity of Ireland'. 8 Contemporaneous CPGB thinking explains why 'Peace' was an imperative of these emissaries. R. Palme Dutt, the CPGB leader most associated with following the Kremlin line, provided 'the framework within which the particular crises and conflicts of Britain and the British Empire-Commonwealth were understood by Communists in the 1950s' (Callaghan, 2003, p. 123) . Dutt believed that the British Empire survived because it helped Britain to facilitate US imperialism. This 'subordinating alliance… threatened to precipitate a third world war, and thus the anti-colonial campaign was linked with the most important single subject of Communist agitation during the 1950s: support for Soviet 'Peace' initiatives and opposition to Anglo-American "warmongering"' (Howe, 1993, p. 187 The De Valera Government failed to win an overall majority because it had failed to solve the long outstanding problems of the Irish people, and had instead entered on the path of retreat, by acceptance of the Marshall plan, and its associated schemes of making Ireland's economy subservient to the needs of imperialism, in particular the preparation for war. 9 Moreover, southern workers refusal to enter into the war alliance without the ending of partition had left the new coalition government with no options other than 'virtual acceptance of a "dominion" or tutelary status'. The key to the coalition government's 'capitulationist policy' (sic) was 'the weakness of Irish capitalism in relation to Britain and America'. 10 This had domestic and international ramifications for the CPGB. In Ireland, there was 'the need for a national-liberation struggle north and south, against British imperialism', whilst in Britain:
the large numbers of exiles in Britain and their close contact with Irish affairs creates the necessity of our approaching them specially (sic) on the basis of the struggle for Irish national unity and independence. The need (sic) for an Irish national movement in Britain, led by us. 11 The challenge was to transform Irish communism into a cohesive movement with a unified political programme as a focal point for a broader coalition of 'progressive' forces. This would also foster greater cohesion amongst Irish emigrants in Britain, notably amongst members of the CPGB and the CA, thereby making communism more attractive to the Irish in Britain. In addition, it might also strengthen CPGB opposition to the robustly anti-communist Association of Catholic Trade Unionists, a particular concern of Harry Pollitt, CPGB General Secretary. 12 The CPGB, therefore, adopted an anti-partitionist stance in some constituencies during its 'pragmatic and opportunistic' general election campaign in 1950 (Jackson, 1963, p. 127 ).
However, the formulation of a unified programme proved elusive for reasons the CPGB well understood, chief among them partition. Throughout the early 1950s, International Department reports contained widespread all-Ireland social and economic analyses, highlighting obstacles posed by: economic unsoundness and entrenched vested interests north and south; British imperialism's historical role in creating these conditions and Anglo-US imperialism's role in their preservation; the organisational duality of trade unions and labour and communist movements arising from partition; and the disunity of 'progressive' forces. A 1953 report stated that in the north, 'it has not been easy to formulate a policy which would unite Protestant and Catholic, town and country, apart from purely economic issues which are insufficient'. In the south, 'the great problem before the Workers' League is how to break through its isolation in the face of the continuous attacks of clerical reaction'. 13 This led the CPGB to encourage a Joint Council of the CP and IWL in November 1952.
Yet, 'differences' at the Council's inaugural meeting obliged the CPGB to despatch a unifying envoy, R. Palme Dutt, to the second, in February 1953. Dutt reported that he attended in a 'consultative capacity and not to lay down a particular political line'. 14 Perhaps aware of the effects of his own formidable reputation, the leading British 'Stalinist' also noted that 'everyone was on their best behaviour' and that the 'so-called differences had been less than alleged'. However, he did encounter 'some tendency for comrades from the South and a minority from Belfast, to press for a stronger line in opposition to partition… and for other representatives from Belfast to emphasise the dangers of isolation from the mass of the Protestant workers from Belfast by appearing to make the issue of partition a central political issue'. Nonetheless, Dutt suggested that Irish communists generally appreciated 'the approach to the aim of national independence of a united Ireland required the strengthening of the working class and democratic movement and the fight for peace on both sides, and the development of co-operation'. 15 Dutt's nominally consultative role reflected an already established CPGB policy and his focus on 'peace', the 'democratic movement' and 'national independence' merely reinforced previous emphasis on these fundamental concerns.
Nevertheless, leading CPGB figures gradually became impatient at the Irish comrades' inability to agree a programme of action for the whole of Ireland. In 1956, Idris Cox of the International Committee noted how a commission of Irish communists, from North and South had met the CPGB's National Executive 'three years ago ' (1953) , with a draft all-Ireland programme. 16 This had taken two years after which time leading CPGB figures had met to 'make a number of proposals for its improvement'. However, the issue had dropped off the radar 'for over a year' as the Irish parties did not respond to the CPGB proposals. 17 Cox believed the absence of such a programme was a 'serious impediment to the political activity of our Irish comrades in Britain'. His logic rested on the grounds that:
While our main emphasis is on their mass activity in relation to their common problems with Irish workers it would obviously be an advantage if [this] was related to what could be done to achieve Irish unity and to give solidarity and support to a united movement in Ireland of democratic advance and socialism. 18 The IWL/CP 'commission' or Joint Council made up of leading IWL and CP members had clearly disappointed expectations in London. As a result, Cox pondered whether the CPGB should attempt to provide a lead in Ireland:
I know that we hesitate to intervene directly in these matters, but it seems to me that the time has come when we should take this matter up again. I don't suggest the Executive Committee adopting any resolution on the matter but rather that yourself and John Gollan should have a personal talk with the Irish comrades this coming weekend and emphasise the urgency of speeding up their discussions on this programme so that more effective political aid can be given in the course of our activity in Britain. 19 Apparently, Cox believed that the CPGB's Executive Committee could pass resolutions on The CP had been forced to vacate its headquarters of twenty years due to financial difficulties, whilst 'landlord opposition' might soon leave the party 'literally… on the streets'. This, McCullough feared, would have 'adverse effects on organisation'. He went on to state:
Years ago, many years ago, it had been the practice for our brother Party in Britain to pay some attention to affairs here, and on many occasions we have had the assistance and advice for periods of time of experienced British comrades.
Unfortunately, except for very occasional visits, about once per year for educational purposes, we have been politically isolated from Britain…But I consider the present crisis in our Party to be of such a serious nature that I am urgently suggesting that you send over to Belfast as quickly as possible a leading British comrade… 21 Gollan read this letter to the CPGB's Political Committee, which proposed a figure visit by a 
The Connolly Association 1945-55
The prevailing historiography of the Connolly Association suggests that it was an 'offshoot' or front of the CPGB (Callaghan, 2003; Milotte, 1984; Treacy, 2012) . This was certainly the view of the CA's long-term political enemies, but one consistently countered by the Association itself and by commentators, usually former or existing members, who point to the CA's noncommunist membership and constitution (Greaves, 78; Coughlan, 1989 This formulation, envisioning CA integration within British communism while leaving scope for distinction accurately describes the relationship. It also correctly identifies the key role played by Greaves. However, it is difficult to write about Greaves, the CA and its relationship with the communist parties in Britain and Ireland in the post-war era without seeing developments as resulting from the weak conditions for communist advance, factionalism and disagreements over basic positions. For some Irish CPGB members, the CA's existence only served as a hindrance to the British party, and they certainly saw Greaves as a rival. Supporters of Greaves have suggested he was the 'intellectual progenitor of the civil rights movement of the 1960s' and that 'it was he who pioneered the idea of a civil rights campaign to undermine Ulster Unionism' (Coughlan, 1989, p. 8) . However, the genesis of civil rights as a communist tactic cannot be understood solely in these terms. Rather than the brainchild of a radical intellectual, the civil rights approach emerged from shifting perspectives and collective debate, 23 He recalled (Greaves, 1978) the CA adopting the 'correct' position on the war:
Of course what had happened was that the popular aspect that had always been in the war had come to predominate, and now the imperialist aspect, while still remaining, was secondary. We were all young and unversed in political thinking. More or less by trial and error we took the measure of things. We supported the war; we defended the right of Ireland to be neutral; we opposed the conscription of Irishmen; and we took up Irish people's grievances (p. 14).
Yet, as the post-war era began to take shape, the Catholic and nationalist Anti-Partition if not devout, the 'Recent' were prepared to support communism 'from a distance'. 26 These views probably did accurately reflect disillusionment with the established political parties in southern Ireland. Delaney has noted that the APL's 'campaign to right the perceived wrong of partition' was 'spearheaded' in Ireland by the 'same Irish politicians who were widely blamed for presiding over dismal conditions at home that forced thousands to leave' (Delaney, 2007, p. 186) . Certainly, the CA recognised the progressive potential of the Labour-voting Irish in Britain, and the 'Recent' in particular, and viewed co-operation with nationalists and republicans as the means to channel this constituency from the faltering APL towards socialism:
The Connolly Association… has grown rapidly in London during the past six months of crisis in the antipartition League. Its policy is to secure the widest possible unity in the struggle for Irish independence, rallying within its own ranks all those who support the teachings of James Connolly whether members of the Communist Party, the Labour Party or no party. In practice about half of its members are Communists… 27 In fact, until 1952, mutual hostility still marked the relationship between the APL leadership and the CA. Indeed, the APL attempted to expel members of the CA throughout 1951, whilst the Irish Democrat spearheaded the 'fight' to prevent this. 28 However, in January 1952 the Irish Democrat sounded a different note, by asking 'Why do the Irish organisations in Britain which stand for an undivided Ireland not pull together to bring nearer their common object? Are the differences in outlook and policy so extreme?' 29 In a tentative offer of détente, the editorial also offered Sinn Féin and the APL column inches in to express their opinions. 30 What it did not say was that the Political Committee of the CPGB had a role in the speculative change in line and that it stemmed from criticism of Greaves' intransigence:
Following criticisms the P.C. laid down general line for special approach to the Irish in Augumn (sic) 1951. This was to be through broad organisation of C.A. and Irish Democrat… The 1955 Constitution of the CA on which the Party was consulted summarizes the approach. 31 In 1951, Jim Prendergast, an influential CPGB and CA figure, contrasted the straightforward, anti-partition and anti-imperialism of CPGB stalwart, William Gallagher, who 'never allows himself to be side-tracked into harmful speculation or comment on the contemporary By 1954, he had retreated somewhat to argue that the CA should be a 'socialist educational body, counter posing socialist to anti-imperialist tasks'. 33 This factionalism assumed more 'dangerous forms' as some Irish CPGB members argued for the setting up of an IWL branch in London. Subsequent attempts to arrange 'socials' and to 'make a drive' selling the Irish Workers' Voice as opposed to the Irish Democrat in areas were the CA was already established, led to fights outside public houses. 34 Greaves repeatedly portrayed this opposition as 'ultra-left' attempts to get the CA merely to 'portray socialism in green paint, to be a transmission belt for the Irish emigrants into British left-wing organisations'. 35 Despite continuing opposition, Greaves evidently concluded that he was the man to consolidate the CA's new 'broad organisation' strategy.
Towards Civil Rights 1955-62
The 1955 CA constitution did not mention the CPGB, and stated that it would not affiliate to or accept affiliation from political parties. It also limited its goal to a thirty-two-county Republic, as opposed to a united socialist Ireland. Furthermore, the Association would not operate in Ireland, as its work lay in Britain, especially amongst the labour movement for the unity of British and Irish workers. 36 Above all, the constitution signalled a coherent political strategy, which combined immediate activity aimed at undermining Ulster Unionism, with the long-term goal of undermining support for partition in Britain. Greaves' biography of Connolly (1961) outlined the theoretical underpinnings:
The issue of national independence (political and economic) is the crux of Irish politics. If, as was Connolly's mature and considered opinion, the national revolution takes precedence, then the working class is not the only revolutionary class… It can expect allies, even if some of them are temporary… A further allied question was that of relations between the British and Irish labour movements. This he answered by advocating complete independence bridged by fraternal interchange (p. 428).
The 'broad organisation' strategy was based on a stages framework: 'We believe that Ireland will one day be socialist with institutions of a form appropriate to Irish requirements.
But we can see no road to that except through national independence and would welcome any suggestions for debating this question in our columns'. 37 This owed a significant debt to broader CPGB thinking on colonialism, which supported national liberation struggles in the Third World. In 1947, Palme Dutt had argued that in colonies which lacked a developed national movement 'the first step should be the fight for democratic and civil rights, which would facilitate the development of such a movement… as part of the general struggle towards independence' (Adi, 1995, p. 179) .
Following the constitution's adoption, the Irish Democrat became increasingly upbeat.
There was a clear focus in relation to work with emigrants: 'first their own defence, second the freedom of their country'. 38 The former should not be underestimated when "No Irish need apply" was reported to be 'back in the Midlands'. 39 In relation to the second, the British labour movement was increasingly courted to 'enlist the services of British Democracy in the struggle for Irish freedom'. 40 Moreover, whilst communist-orientated sectarianism, particularly in relation to the Labour Party -'Labour imperialism' -and the APL did not dissipate entirely, the Irish Democrat was cautious not to inflame anti-communist feeling. It notably did not dwell on the Hungarian revolution in 1956. Events were primarily viewed through the prism of the reaction they invoked in Dublin, where the IWL's bookshop was attacked:
There is no need to remark that opinion is overwhelmingly against Russia, and nearly as overwhelmingly against the Kadar Government… We can only wait and see -and in the meantime Ireland the country of our birth deserves just a little of her sons' time and attention. 41 In other words, the 'broad organisation' policy marked the final shift away from the tendency of the CA, through Greaves, to publically view Ireland through a Cold War lens. The CPGB regarded the changed policy as a success, as by April 1955, the majority 'of the Connolly Association membership are non-Party members and the proportion is increasing as the organisation sheds the sectarianism which has hampered its work in the past.' 42 A (1957) diary entry by the devout Catholic, Dónal MacAmlaigh, one of the 'Recent', supports this assessment:
This is a socialist paper [Irish Democrat] put out by the Connolly Clubs. Many of the Irish here are against the people responsible for the paper as they are inclined to be very much to the left but I think they're an honest enough bunch who are seriously concerned about the bad state that Ireland is in. It's said that they are Communists but I doubt that. Only a short while ago, I was talking to a priest who told me that the English Communists had failed to get any good out of them at all (p. 112).
The onset of the IRA's 'border campaign' in December 1956 had a galvanising effect.
The Association refused to condemn the IRA outright and, emphasised the structural, or imperialist, roots of the conflict while criticising of the Ulster Unionist Party's authoritarian reaction, particularly in the sphere of civil liberties. This involved a number of showpiece campaigns. The first was the 'Mallon and Talbot campaign', which successfully exposed the use of force by the Royal Ulster Constabulary to extract false confessions from two Catholic youths sent to trial for murdering a police officer. This 'had quite an impact on the Labour movement' and was extended into attacking the Unionist Party's internment of suspected republicans (Greaves, 1978, p. 29) . The second campaign focused on the workings of the 1949 Government of Ireland Act, specifically on how this prevented British MPs from discussing discriminatory practices in Northern Ireland:
It is felt that the central point to work at is that the refusal of the British Home Sec. to answer questions re Northern Ireland is unconstitutional. Hostettler has carefully examined all the Acts of Parliament and says this is his firm view. Therefore, to get a big lobby early in March on this question (placing in the forefront the actual, at present existing denials of democracy in the six counties) would open up the possibilities of further agitation around the whole question of N.I. 43 Ultimately these campaigns gained the attention and support of several Labour MPs. However, the apparent successes heralded by 'broad organisation' were not immediately or universally appreciated. To many, rapprochement with republicans appeared incompatible with the theory and image of the CPGB, and with that party's relationship with the Irish in Britain.
In claiming that the IRA was anti-imperialist and therefore progressive, rather its 'terrorist activities' merely antagonised 'the protestant majority' thereby strengthening the Unionist Government. He further claimed that Greaves' 'line' was 'equally unacceptable' to the CP and IWL. 45 The CPGB responded that Greaves' article represented a 'historical treatment' rather than a 'Party Pronouncement' and that a public discourse on the IRA would be unwise as the CP and IWL 'are engaged in joint discussion with a view to preparing, if possible, a joint document on their views on the Irish Nationalist question and the tactics of the movement in Ireland'. 46 Greaves was in fact a participant in these discussions. 47 Of course, as noted above, the 'joint document' of the IWL and the CP proved elusive.
In October 1958, the CPGB's Political Committee CA's strategy refused to support a pronouncement Greaves had prepared in relation to the Mallon and Talbot campaign. This asserted, 'the British Labour movement should press for the withdrawal of British troops from Northern Ireland, for as long as those troops are there, the British people are implicated in the government of that territory'. 48 The Political Committee elected 'after very careful thought, that it would not be wise for the Party, to take the step you suggest and get ourselves committed to a statement of the kind proposed'. 49 Unfortunately, no explanation was provided for the decision, although it was possibly also due to the aforementioned discussions between the CP and the IWL, and ongoing debates about a 'United Ireland' in the context of the IRA's ongoing border campaign.
However, other critics within the CA were less circumspect during a crisis in the Association in late 1958. The divisions around whether the CA should operate as a 'broad organisation' or as a London Irish branch of the CPGB and Greaves' alleged 'dictatorial' leadership style finally came to a head. The serious dispute led to the suspension of thirty-five members following a brawl at an Association 'social'. Greaves' most bitter opponents made unsubstantiated allegations that he had embezzled profits from the Irish Democrat. In response, his supporters railed against 'questionable party elements and Trotskyists'. 50 However, opposition extended beyond the personal or 'ultra-leftist'. Some members clearly However, the Connolly Association also successfully affiliated to the National Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL), which 'had a parliamentary group, supported by MPs from the three main parties at Westminster' (Redmond, 2010, p. 6) . This would help bring the benefits of 'broad organisation' to Ireland prior to the return of the CA luminaries.
In 1962, three British Labour MPs travelled to Northern Ireland under the auspices of the NCCL to investigate allegations of discrimination. They met with representatives from a number of organisations including the IRA, the Belfast branch of the NCCL and workers from Harland and Wolff and Shorts. 54 Prior to the delegation travelling, Greaves met leading CP figures with 'a proposal that investigators should go to the six counties', and, following the 'highly successful' event, he wholesomely praised Belfast communists:
Desmond would like to emphasise that the co-operation of the Party in the Northern Ireland was really first-rate. They gave the matter their most serious attention and did everything possible to help. Martin Ennals from the National Council of Civil Liberties had been there just prior to this delegation and rather queered the pitch by his approach to people. The Party helped to overcome this difficulty by spending considerable time working out how to approach different people to be seen, in what order they would be seen, etc... 55 The CP's support of the NCCL delegation represented a tangible success and marked the genesis of the party's involvement in a civil rights strategy. Indeed, the concept of 'broad 
